Working Paper · GovGreed Research · Accountability

The Margin Machine

Every congressional wealth tracker publishes a number. None publish what the debt is. We parsed the liability schedules instead of the totals, and separated the mortgages from the margin — the loans taken against the portfolio itself. Thirteen members of Congress disclose that kind of borrowing. One household holds 75 percent of it.

Live data Published July 15, 2026 Last verified July 15, 2026 ~8 min read Primary source: Personal Financial Disclosures
Wall Street in New York City, the financial district where brokerage margin accounts are held
The collateral is the portfolio. A margin loan is money borrowed against the securities already in the account — the same holdings that appear in the asset column of a financial disclosure, pledged against the debt in the liability column. Photo: Dietmar Rabich, CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons.
Abstract

Congressional wealth is reported as a single number: assets minus liabilities, at bracket midpoints. That number tells you how much debt a member carries. It never tells you what the debt is. GovGreed parsed the liability schedules of 4,430 annual Personal Financial Disclosures filed by 489 members between 2018 and 2025 and separated the mortgages from the margin. Only thirteen members of Congress disclose securities-backed borrowing — a loan against the portfolio itself — and one household holds $78.0M of the $104.2M total: 75 percent, 5.2× the next-largest, 26× the third. Nancy Pelosi (D-CA) discloses two brokerage margin accounts, each in the $25,000,001–$50,000,000 bracket, plus a brokerage collateral loan, against $228.6M of disclosed assets. The second margin account is new: it appears for the first time on the annual covering calendar year 2025 — the same calendar year the household bought the five-leg, deep-in-the-money options batch documented in GGR-WP-2026-14. The form does not connect the two. Neither does this paper. Borrowing against a portfolio is legal, ordinary at this scale, and disclosed exactly as required. The finding is that the composition of congressional debt is public, unexamined, and concentrated almost entirely in one place.

One limit is worth stating in the abstract rather than the footnotes, because it bounds everything above. The form asks for the creditor, the type and the amount. It never asks what secures the loan. Four further members disclose $53.3M of credit lines drawn from brokerages and investment banks where the filing is simply silent on the collateral — the largest a $37.5M line from Goldman Sachs that would rank second in this paper if securities backed it. We do not count them, because the record does not say. Every number here is a floor, set by the filers' own choice of words.

13
Members borrowing on margin
of 489 with a parsed filing
75%
Held by one household
$78.0M of $104.2M
5.2×
Ahead of second place
$78.0M vs $15.0M
4,430
Disclosures parsed
489 members, 2018–2025

1. The number everyone quotes, and the schedule nobody reads

Search any member of Congress and a net-worth figure comes back. The method behind it is standard and reasonable: a disclosure form reports assets and liabilities in ranges, so you take the midpoint of the assets, subtract the midpoint of the liabilities, and publish the difference. GovGreed's own member pages do exactly this.

That arithmetic is fine. It is also where everyone stops. The subtraction collapses the entire liability schedule into one figure, and the schedule is the interesting part — because a mortgage on a house and a loan against a stock portfolio are not the same object, and the form distinguishes them by name.

So we read the schedule. Across 4,430 annual disclosures from 489 members between 2018 and 2025, 357 members disclose debt of some kind. Almost all of it is what you would expect: mortgages, home equity lines, the occasional student loan. Ordinary balance sheets, at unusual sizes.

Then there is a second category, and it is nearly empty. Thirteen members disclose borrowing against their own securities — a margin loan, or a loan collateralised by a brokerage account. It is 13.6 percent of all congressional debt by value, and it behaves nothing like a mortgage. The collateral is not a building. It is the portfolio the member reports in the asset column.

2. Data and methodology

Every figure here traces to a public federal record. Members file an annual Personal Financial Disclosure listing assets, income, positions and liabilities, each within a bracketed range. We parsed those filings into structured rows and classified every liability by the type the filer declared — Mortgage, Margin, Brokerage Collateral Loan, Equity Line of Credit, and so on. A liability counts as securities-backed under either of two tests: the declared type, creditor or description names a margin or brokerage arrangement; or it names a lender's securities-based credit product by its brand name.

The second test was added in v1.1, and it is worth explaining rather than burying, because its absence cost this paper three members. Two wirehouse products carry names that describe the collateral only if you already know the product: Morgan Stanley's Liquidity Access Line and its Portfolio Loan are both, by the lender's own published definition, lines of credit secured by the client's brokerage account. A word-match on “margin” and “brokerage” does not see either. Josh Gottheimer ($3.00M), Jonathan Jackson ($0.38M) and Sheldon Whitehouse ($0.18M) all disclose one, and v1.0 of this paper missed all three. They are in Table 1 now.

Dollar figures are bracket midpoints, the same convention every tracker uses. This matters more than usual here: the top liability bracket is $25,000,001–$50,000,000, so a $37.5M midpoint stands for a range $25M wide. Both of Pelosi's margin accounts sit in that top bracket. $78.0M is a midpoint, not a number she filed. The number she filed is a floor of $50,000,002 and a ceiling of $100,000,000, plus the collateral loan.

Each member is counted once, on their latest parsed filing. Filing years differ per member, so the year is printed beside every row in Table 1 — two of the thirteen are several years stale, and we say which.

One validation worth stating. Our parse of Pelosi's annual covering calendar 2024 returns a liability range of $36,000,009 to $102,000,000 — matching, to the dollar, the range reported in contemporaneous press coverage of that filing. The parser reproduces the published record exactly, including its odd nine-dollar tail.

3. The receipts: thirteen members, and one of them is 75 percent

Table 1 is the entire category as the filings describe it — not a top ten, the whole list. Every member of Congress whose most recent parsed annual discloses borrowing against securities. What it is not, and cannot be, is every member who does so: see section 6, where four more disclose brokerage credit lines the form never asks them to explain.

Table 1 · All disclosed securities-backed borrowing in Congress
MemberParty / StateFiling yearMargin & brokerage debtRows
Nancy PelosiD–CA2025$78.00M3
Gilbert CisnerosD–CA2019 (stale)$15.00M1
Josh GottheimerD–NJ2024$3.00M1
John HickenlooperD–CO2025$3.00M1
Jay ObernolteR–CA2024$3.00M1
Vicente GonzalezD–TX2021 (stale)$0.75M1
Ted CruzR–TX2025$0.38M1
Jonathan JacksonD–IL2025$0.38M1
Robert C. “Bobby” ScottD–VA2024$0.21M2
Greg LandsmanD–OH2025$0.18M1
Sheldon WhitehouseD–RI2025$0.18M1
Adam SchiffD–CA2025$0.08M1
Shelley Moore CapitoR–WV2025$0.03M1

Latest parsed annual per member; filing year shown because it differs. Dollar figures are bracket midpoints. A liability counts here when the declared type, creditor or description names a margin or brokerage arrangement, or names a lender's securities-based credit product (Liquidity Access Line, Portfolio Loan). Verified July 15, 2026. Source: congressional Personal Financial Disclosures.

Twelve members of Congress borrow against their portfolios in amounts between $30,000 and $15 million. The thirteenth borrows $78 million.

The distribution is not a leaderboard so much as a cliff. Eight of the thirteen disclose less than $1 million — the kind of margin balance an ordinary brokerage customer runs. Cisneros' $15.0M is real but comes from a 2019 filing, six years stale. Everything above that is one household.

4. What Pelosi's schedule actually says

Eleven liabilities appear on the annual covering calendar year 2025. Six are mortgages on named properties — a Zinfandel Lane address in Napa County, 3030 K Street in Washington, Belden and Point Lobos in San Francisco. Two are equity lines of credit. One is a revolving line at Heritage Bank. Ordinary, if large.

The remaining three are the story. Charles Schwab & Company — Margin — $25,000,001 to $50,000,000. City National Securities, Ongoing Brokerage Margin Account — $25,000,001 to $50,000,000. City National Bank, Brokerage Collateral Loan — $1,000,001 to $5,000,000. All three are marked spouse on the form. At midpoints, $78.0 million borrowed against securities, set against $228.6 million of disclosed assets.

Table 2 · What changed between the two most recent annuals
LiabilityTypeCY2024 annualCY2025 annual
City National SecuritiesMargin$25,000,001–$50,000,000$25,000,001–$50,000,000
Charles Schwab & CompanyMargin— not present —$25,000,001–$50,000,000
City National BankBrokerage Collateral Loan$1,000,001–$5,000,000$1,000,001–$5,000,000
Heritage BankLine of Credit— not present —$250,001–$500,000
Six mortgages & two equity linesunchangedunchanged
Total disclosed range$36,000,009–$102,000,000$61,250,011–$152,500,000

Annual disclosures are filed the following May: the CY2024 annual was filed 2025-05-15, the CY2025 annual 2026-05-15. Nine liability rows became eleven. Everything except the two highlighted lines is identical. The CY2024 range matches contemporaneous press reporting to the dollar. Verified July 15, 2026.

The floor moved from $36.0M to $61.25M — up 70 percent — after sitting unchanged for four consecutive filings. One new line explains almost all of it.

5. Discussion: leverage on leverage

GovGreed's companion paper, The Pelosi Options Machine, documents a strategy: deep-in-the-money, long-dated call options, bought a year out and exercised into stock rather than sold. On January 14, 2025 the household bought fifty contracts each on five companies spanning the AI trade, and exercised all five into 25,000 shares a year later. A deep-in-the-money call is itself a leveraged instrument — that is the entire point of the structure.

This paper adds the layer underneath. In the same calendar year, a second margin account in the $25,000,001–$50,000,000 bracket appears on the disclosure for the first time. Leverage inside the position; borrowed money around it.

The form does not connect the two, and neither do we. A financial disclosure lists assets and liabilities on separate schedules; it never links a specific loan to a specific purchase, and no public record says the margin funded the calls. What the record shows is narrower and still worth stating plainly: both grew, in the same year, in the same household, and each is disclosed in a place almost nobody reads next to the other.

6. Limitations and caveats

Midpoints are not measurements. Both margin accounts sit in the top bracket, which is $25 million wide. The true total is somewhere between $51.0M and $105.0M. We report $78.0M because that is the convention; we flag it because at this bracket the convention is doing a lot of work.

The form never asks what secures a loan — and this is the binding limit. It asks for the creditor, the type, the interest rate and the bracket. Nothing on it requires a filer to say whether securities are the collateral. Table 1 therefore counts only liabilities whose own wording gives it away. Four members disclose credit lines drawn from brokerages and investment banks where the filing is silent, totalling $53.3M:

Table 3 · Brokerage credit lines with the collateral unstated on the form
MemberParty / StateFiling yearCreditor & declared typeBracket midpoint
Daniel S. GoldmanD–NY2024Goldman Sachs · “Bank Line of Credit”$37.50M
David McCormickR–PA2025Fidelity · Line of Credit, 6.75% on demand$15.00M
Sara JacobsD–CA2024Merrill Lynch · Line of Credit$0.75M
Tammy DuckworthD–IL2025Edward Jones · Line of Credit$0.08M

Liabilities on the member's latest parsed annual, drawn from a brokerage or investment-bank counterparty, where neither the declared type nor the description states the collateral. These are not counted in Table 1 and are not asserted to be securities-backed. Verified July 15, 2026. Source: congressional Personal Financial Disclosures.

Any of these may be secured by securities. Any may not be. Goldman's line, at a $37.5M midpoint, is larger than every entry in Table 1 except Pelosi's — if securities back it, it is the second-biggest in Congress and this paper's distribution changes shape. We do not count it, because the record does not say, and a census built on inference is not a census. The honest statement is the uncomfortable one: the true size of this category is unknowable from the disclosure regime that exists, and the fix is one column on a form.

The filings are not synchronised. Table 1 uses each member's latest parsed annual, and two of the thirteen are years old. Cisneros' $15.0M is from 2019 and may no longer exist. The table is a census of what is on the record, not a snapshot of a single day.

Coverage is partial. Of 4,430 filings, 3,995 parsed cleanly and 435 are scanned images we could not read into rows. A member whose filings fall in that second group would not appear in Table 1 even if they carried margin debt. The category is a floor, not a ceiling.

Net worth is not the finding here, and a naive subtraction produces nonsense. Personal residences are excluded from the asset schedule while their mortgages are disclosed as liabilities, and a member holding property through a partnership reports a percentage share of a mortgage against an asset line bracketed separately. Both effects can drive a computed net worth below zero for members who are not remotely insolvent. We report margin precisely because it is unambiguous: the collateral is securities, and those securities are in the asset column.

Margin borrowing is legal, ordinary for portfolios this size, fully disclosed, and marked spouse on the form. Nothing here alleges wrongdoing. The finding is scale, concentration, and the fact that nobody had looked.

7. Conclusion

The debate about congressional wealth runs on a single number, and the number is not wrong. It is just thin. Subtracting liabilities from assets answers “how much,” and then quietly discards the answer to “of what.”

Read the schedule instead and a category appears that almost no one occupies: thirteen members, borrowing against the portfolios they report to the public, and one household holding three quarters of it. That fact required no leak, no source, and no model. It required reading page nine of a form that has been public since May, and asking what the debt was for.

And then the form stops answering. It will tell you that a member owes Goldman Sachs somewhere between $25 and $50 million, and it will not tell you what he pledged to get it. That is not an oversight in our parse; it is the design of the disclosure. The category we can measure is concentrated in one household. The category we cannot measure is the one nobody has asked Congress to disclose.

Data availability

Primary sources. Liability types, creditors, owners, brackets and filing dates come from annual congressional Personal Financial Disclosures (House Clerk and Senate Office of Public Records), parsed into structured rows. Asset totals come from the same filings' asset schedules. The options batch referenced in section 5 comes from Periodic Transaction Reports filed under the STOCK Act and is documented in full in GGR-WP-2026-14.

Derived dataset. The securities-backed classification, the per-member totals, and the CY2024/CY2025 comparison are reproducible from the filings and the classification rule stated in section 2. A machine-readable export is available on request — see “Sourcing this for a story?” below.

Reproducibility & verification

This is an independent working paper. Produced by GovGreed Research; not externally peer-reviewed. The thirteen-member census, the $104.2M total, the $78.0M household figure, the 13.6% margin share of all congressional debt, the $53.3M of collateral-unstated brokerage lines in Table 3, the 4,430 filings / 489 members / 3,995 parsed / 435 scanned coverage counts, and the CY2024→CY2025 schedule comparison were derived live and verified as of July 15, 2026.

Product classification. Morgan Stanley's Liquidity Access Line and Portfolio Loan Account are treated as securities-backed on the lender's own published definition — both are documented by Morgan Stanley as lines of credit collateralised by the client's brokerage account. No member's collateral was inferred from anything other than the words on their filing or the lender's public description of the named product.

External check. Our parse of the CY2024 annual returns a liability range of $36,000,009–$102,000,000, matching contemporaneous press reporting of that filing to the dollar. This is an independent confirmation that the liability parser reproduces the published record rather than approximating it.

Conflict of interest & funding

GovGreed is a commercial congressional-trading-intelligence platform; GovGreed Research is its analysis function. This paper received no external funding, and no member named here was given prior review. It uses only public federal records and is released free to read, quote, and reproduce under CC BY 4.0 with attribution. Nothing here alleges wrongdoing. Borrowing against a portfolio is lawful, unexceptional for accounts of this size, and disclosed exactly as the form requires; the margin lines discussed are marked as the spouse's on the filing. The paper makes no claim that any loan funded any trade, and no claim of foreknowledge. The finding is the concentration of a disclosed category that has not previously been separated out.

Revision history

v1.1 · 2026-07-15 — Correction. v1.0 reported the census as ten members and $100.6M. It is thirteen and $104.2M. The v1.0 classifier matched the words “margin” and “brokerage”, which silently excluded three members who disclose a wirehouse securities-based credit line under its brand name instead: Josh Gottheimer (Morgan Stanley Portfolio Loan, $3.00M), Jonathan Jackson and Sheldon Whitehouse (Morgan Stanley Liquidity Access Line, $0.38M and $0.18M). Both products are, by Morgan Stanley's own published definition, secured by the client's brokerage account. Jackson's row was additionally lost to a null-handling fault: his liability type is blank, and in SQL a null compared against every branch of the rule returns null rather than false, so the row was dropped without ever being rejected. Consequently: Pelosi's share falls 78% → 75%, margin's share of all congressional debt rises 13.1% → 13.6%, and the headline becomes twelve members between $30,000 and $15 million against a thirteenth at $78 million. Her 5.2× lead over second place and 26× over third are unchanged. Separately, v1.0 stated that “seven of the ten” disclose under $1M; the correct count was six of ten, and is now eight of thirteen. Every one of these errors ran in the direction of a cleaner story — a rounder census, a bigger concentration, a tidier cliff — which is precisely why they are itemised here. Section 6 and Table 3 are new: they disclose the four members holding $53.3M of brokerage credit lines whose collateral the form never asks about, and retire v1.0's claim that Table 1 was “the whole list.” It is the whole list of filings that say so, which is a weaker and truer claim.

v1.0 · 2026-07-15 — Initial publication. Census, totals, schedule comparison and coverage counts derived live and verified as of July 15, 2026.

Frequently asked

What is a margin loan and why does it matter here?
A margin loan is money borrowed from a broker against the securities already in the account. It matters because the collateral is the portfolio itself: the same holdings that appear in the asset column of a financial disclosure are pledged against the debt in the liability column. Unlike a mortgage, it is a direct claim on the investments a member reports.
Do wealth trackers already account for liabilities?
Yes. Published congressional net-worth figures are generally the midpoint of total assets minus the midpoint of total liabilities, and GovGreed's own member pages do the same. This paper is not a correction to those figures. It separates the liabilities by type, which is a step no tracker publishes.
How much margin debt does Congress disclose?
Thirteen members disclose it at all, totalling $104.2 million at bracket midpoints on their latest parsed filing. Nancy Pelosi's household accounts for $78.0 million of that — 75 percent — across two brokerage margin accounts and a brokerage collateral loan. The next-largest is $15.0 million; the third is $3.0 million.
Does the margin debt fund the options trades?
The public record does not say, and this paper does not claim it. A financial disclosure lists assets and liabilities separately; it never links a specific loan to a specific purchase. What the record shows is that a second margin account in the $25,000,001–$50,000,000 bracket appears for the first time on the annual covering calendar year 2025, the same calendar year the household bought its five-leg options batch. Both facts are disclosed. The connection between them is not.
Is any of this against the rules?
No. Borrowing against a portfolio is legal, ordinary for accounts of this size, and disclosed exactly as the form requires. Nothing in this paper alleges wrongdoing. Every figure comes from filings members were legally required to submit.
Are these thirteen members definitely the whole list?
They are the whole list of members whose filings say so. That is not the same thing. The disclosure form asks for the creditor, the type and the amount — it never asks what secures the loan. Four more members disclose $53.3 million in credit lines from brokerages and investment banks where the form is simply silent on the collateral, including a $37.5 million line from Goldman Sachs that would rank second in this paper if securities backed it. We do not count them, because the record does not say. The census is a floor set by the filers' own choice of words.
Why not publish net worth for every member?
Because a naive subtraction produces nonsense. Personal residences are excluded from the asset schedule while their mortgages appear as liabilities, and members holding property through partnerships disclose their percentage share of a mortgage against an asset line that is bracketed separately. Both effects can drive a reported net worth below zero for members who are not insolvent. This paper reports margin, which is unambiguous, and treats the net-worth arithmetic as context.

Sourcing this for a story?

Every figure on this page is reproducible from public federal records, and the classification rule is stated in section 2. Machine-readable exports of the liability schedules, the securities-backed census, and the per-member comparison are available to journalists on request. Methods across the series are documented at /research.

References & data sources

  1. Congressional Personal Financial Disclosures — annual filings (House Clerk; Senate Office of Public Records). 4,430 filings from 489 members, 2018–2025; 3,995 parsed, 435 scanned-only.
  2. STOCK Act Periodic Transaction Reports — the January 2025 options batch and its January 2026 exercise, documented in GGR-WP-2026-14.
  3. Filing dates — annual disclosures are filed the following May; the CY2024 annual was filed 2025-05-15 (doc 10066169) and the CY2025 annual 2026-05-15 (doc 10075701).
  4. External validation — contemporaneous press reporting of the CY2024 filing gives a liability range of $36,000,009–$102,000,000, matching this parse to the dollar.
  5. Image credit — Wall Street, New York City — Dietmar Rabich, CC BY-SA 4.0 via Wikimedia Commons.

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Not financial advice. All data from public federal disclosures.