Enhanced COVID-19 Transparency Act of 2025

119 S3291 IS: Enhanced COVID-19 Transparency Act of 2025 U.S. Senate 2025-12-01 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain. II 119th CONGRESS 1st Session S. 3291 IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES December 1, 2025 Mr. Young introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Select Committee on Intelligence A BILL To require a declassification review for intelligence relating to the COVID–19 pandemic, and for other purposes. 1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Enhanced COVID-19 Transparency Act of 2025 . 2. Declassification of intelligence and additional transparency measures relating to the COVID–19 pandemic (a) Definitions In this section, the terms congressional intelligence committees and intelligence community have the meanings given such terms in section 3 of the National Security Act of 1947 ( 50 U.S.C. 3003 ). (b) In general Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the Director of National Intelligence and each head of an element of the intelligence community shall jointly— (1) perform a declassification review of intelligence products relating to the origins of the Coronavirus Disease 2019 (COVID–19), including— (A) research conducted at the Wuhan Institute of Virology or any other medical or scientific research center within the People’s Republic of China; (B) information relating to Gain of Function research and the intention of this research; and (C) information relating to sources of funding or direction for research on coronaviruses, including both sources within the People’s Republic of China and foreign sources; (2) perform a declassification review of intelligence products relating to efforts by government officials of entities of the People’s Republic of China— (A) to disrupt or obstruct information sharing or investigations into the origins of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID–19) pandemic; (B) to disrupt the sharing of medically significant information relating to the transmissibility and potential harm of SARS–CoV–2 to humans, including— (i) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United States Government; (ii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the governments of allies and partners of the United States; and (iii) efforts to limit the sharing of information with the United Nations and World Health Organization; (C) to obstruct or otherwise limit the sharing of information between national, provincial, and city governments within the People’s Republic of China and between subnational entities within the People's Republic of China and external researchers; (D) to deny the sharing of information with the United States, allies and partners of the United States, or multilateral organizations, including the United Nations and the World Health Organization; (E) to pressure or lobby foreign governments, journalists, medical researchers, officials of the United States Government, or officials of multilateral organizations (including the United Nations and the World Health Organization) with respect to the source, scientific origins, transmissibility, or other attributes of the SARS–CoV–2 virus or the COVID–19 pandemic; (F) to disrupt government or private-sector efforts to conduct research and development of medical interventions or countermeasures for the COVID–19 pandemic, including vaccines; and (G) to promote alternative narratives regarding the origins of COVID–19 as well as the domestic Chinese and international response to the COVID–19 pandemic; (3) make available to the public appropriately declassified intelligence products described under paragraphs (1) and (2), including such redactions as the Director, with the concurrence of the head of the originating element of the intelligence community, determines necessary to protect sources and methods and information concerning United States persons; and (4) submit to the congressional intelligence committees an unredacted version of the declassified intelligence products described in paragraph (3).