Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025

119 HR 1215 IH: Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025 U.S. House of Representatives 2025-02-11 text/xml EN Pursuant to Title 17 Section 105 of the United States Code, this file is not subject to copyright protection and is in the public domain. I 119th CONGRESS 1st Session H. R. 1215 IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES February 11, 2025 Mr. Stanton (for himself and Mr. Johnson of South Dakota ) introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Affairs A BILL To support efforts of the governments of Western Hemisphere countries to increase the diversity of their upstream supply chains and downstream supply chains. 1. Short title This Act may be cited as the Semiconductor Supply Chain Security and Diversification Act of 2025 . 2. Definitions In this Act— (1) the term upstream supply chain includes mining, production, or processing of critical minerals used in semiconductor manufacturing, including— (A) zinc; (B) gallium; (C) germanium; (D) silicon; (E) lithium; and (F) cobalt; and (2) the term downstream supply chain includes— (A) testing and packaging facilities for semiconductors; and (B) advanced testing and packaging facilities for semiconductors. 3. Sense of Congress; statement of policy (a) Sense of Congress It is the sense of Congress that the United States has an economic and national security interest in diversifying the semiconductor supply chain, specifically by encouraging the development of a regionally-based semiconductor ecosystems in the Western Hemisphere to compliment the investments in the United States under the CHIPS and Science Act. (b) Statement of policy It is the policy of the United States— (1) to promote the security of allies and partners of the United States by encouraging the development of accessible, transparent, competitive, and robust semiconductor markets that provide diversified sources, types, and parts of the semiconductor chip; and (2) to encourage United States public and private sector investment in Latin American semiconductor infrastructure projects to bridge the gap between national security needs and commercial demand in a way that is consistent with the region’s absorptive capacity. 4. Supporting efforts of the governments of Western Hemisphere countries to increase the diversity of their upstream supply chains and downstream supply chains (a) In general In carrying out the policy described in section 3(b), the Secretary of State, in consultation with the Secretary of Commerce and the heads of other relevant United States agencies, shall, as appropriate, focus the efforts of the Department of State and those agencies in supporting the efforts of the governments of Western Hemisphere countries to increase the diversity of their upstream supply chains and downstream supply chains, including through— (1) providing diplomatic and political support to the Organization of American States and Western Hemisphere governments, as necessary— (A) to facilitate international negotiations concerning cross-border infrastructure; (B) to enhance the Western Hemisphere’s regulatory environment with respect to semiconductors; and (C) to develop accessible, transparent, and competitive supply chain markets and downstream supply chain markets that are supplied by diverse sources, types, and routes of energy; and (2) providing support to improve Western Hemisphere upstream supply chains and downstream supply chains for semiconductors, including— (A) to diversify the sources and supply routes of Western Hemisphere countries; and (B) to enhance semiconductor market integration across the regions. (b) Terms and conditions For the purposes of providing support for projects under this section, the following terms and conditions shall apply: (1) The United States International Development Finance Corporation may provide support for upstream supply chain and downstream supply chain projects in countries in the Western Hemisphere with upper-middle-income economies or high-income economies (as those terms are defined by the World Bank). (2) The restrictions under section 1412(c)(2) of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 ( 22 U.S.C. 9612(c)(2) ) shall not apply. (3) The Corporation shall restrict the provision of such support in a country described in paragraph (1) unless— (A) the President certifies to the appropriate congressional committees that such support furthers the national economic or foreign policy interests of the United States; and (B) such support is— (i) designed to produce significant developmental outcomes or provide developmental benefits to the poorest population of that country; or (ii) necessary to preempt or counter efforts by a strategic competitor of the United States to secure significant political or economic leverage or acquire national security-sensitive technologies or infrastructure in a country that is an ally or partner of the United States. (c) Appropriate congressional committees defined In this section, the term appropriate congressional committees has the meaning given that term in section 1402 of the Better Utilization of Investments Leading to Development Act of 2018 ( 22 U.S.C. 9601 ).